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Dettmer:
Florida's Public Employee Unions: How Long Must
they Wait?
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAIV REVIEW[
(Vol. XXVN
The widespread availability and use of all types of liability insurance, the
ability of insurers to protect themselves through contractual conditions in their
policies, and the adoption of no-fault insurance have negated all but one of
the arguments that have been used to support parental immunity in Florida.
The argument that a parent must have the authority to exercise proper
parental control and discipline cannot be rebutted. Instead, the problem must
be dealt with positively. The traditional standard of reasonableness viewed in
the light of the parental role should be applied to determine a parent's liability to his minor child. It is therefore proposed that Florida abandon the parental immunity doctrine. In determining a parent's amenability to suit by
his child, Florida courts should apply the test of: "[Wlhat would an ordinarily
72
reasonableand prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?"
Only by such total abrogation of parental immunity can Florida be assured
that minor children will be properly protected from the negligence of their
parents.
W. RODERICK BOWIOIN

FLORIDA'S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS:
HOW LONG MUST THEY WAIT?
The few states which to date have failed to adopt meaningful and comprehensive legislation dealing with public sector labor relations . . .
must be goaded into action. Public sector unionism is here to stay and
every state must now be prepared to address the problem with legislative
sophistication,tolerance, and imagination.'
Mass unionization of public employees is now a fact. The formation of
over 200 municipal public employee unions in the past decade surpasses the
total number formed in the prior fifty years. 2 Seventy-five per cent of the nation's 1,400,000 primary and secondary school teachers are now union members,
and the trend has spread to include over 100 colleges and universities.3 Significantly, public sector unionization is accelerating at a time when union
membership in private industry is declining relative to total employment.4
72.
I.

Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis added).
Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQUESNE L.

REV. 357, 382 (1972).

2. Porter, 1973: Year for Strikes, Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Jan. 4, 1973, §A at 13, col. I.
3. Id.
4. Stieber, State Local Unions Pass Industry and Still Going Strong, LABOR-MANAGE.IENT
RELATIONS SERVICES NEWSLETTER 7 (1971), cited in 10 DUQUESNE L. REv. 357 (1972).
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The increase in public sector unionization is attributable to several factors:
a history of lower pay for public employees as compared to their private industry counterparts, the recent decline of governmental job security, the inability of governmental bureaucracy to implement progressive management
methods used by private industry to temper the desire for unionization, and
increased public tolerance of strikes and union activities by public employees
as an outgrowth of growing militancy on the social scene.5
DEVELOPMENT IN FLORIDA

Public employee unionization in Florida remains a restive and unappeased
force after a quarter century of legal confrontations with government. The
initial judicial encounter came in Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. City

of MiamiG where the municipal employees local sought a declaration of rights
following city refusals to grant union recognition. The Florida supreme court
held that the "right to work" provision of the 1885 constitutionr gave no

rights of collective bargaining to any group per se, although such rights might
be provided by statute. Florida's labor organization statute,8 which grants employees the right to bargain collectively,9 was construed to apply only to employees of private industry. Public employees therefore were afforded no
rights of collective bargaining or negotiation, and their unions were not recognized by their governmental employer.
The restrictive view adopted by the court may be attributed to a failure to
distinguish strike-enforced collective bargaining of the private sector ° from
bilateral negotiations between government and public employees that adhere
to the common law strike prohibition."' This distinction has been acknowledged by courts in other states 12

5.

See Porter, supra note 2.

6. 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946).
7. FLA. Cowsr. art. I, §12 (1885) provided: "The right of persons to work shall not be
denied or abridged on account of membership in any labor union or labor organization;
provided that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees
by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer."
8.

FLA. STAT. ch. 447

(1971) (labor organizations).

9. FLA. STAT. §447.03 (1971).
10. Id.

11. The court's rationale may be explained as an endorsement of the sovereignty
theory, which holds that all legitimate societal power rests with government, which should
not be subjected to countervailing forces exerted by labor unions.
A fundamental basis for the theory is the concept that "the King can do no wrong."
Accordingly, public "servants" are deemed to have a higher commitment to furthering the
programs of government. In return for this commitment, the "King" will respond to fulfill
the needs of the "servants." See Edwards, supra note I, at 360-61. See also Exec. Order (Fla.)
(May 13, 1970, Kirk, Governor). The potential breakdown of this idealistic relation caused
the court in Miami Water Works to remark: "[I]t would seem that a strike against the city
would amount, in effect, to a strike against government itself - a situation difficult to reconcile with all notions of government." 157 Fla. at 451, 26 So. 2d at 197. The notion of sover-
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The 1959 Florida Legislature also recognized this distinction in section
839.221, Florida Statutes,13 which restated the strike prohibition 14 but allowed
public employees the "right to present proposals relative to salaries and other
conditions of employment through representatives of their own choosing." 15
In 1968, however, the right to present proposals proved unsatisfactory to a
Pinellas County teachers' union that threatened to strike as a means of reopening previously negotiated contracts. In Pinellas County Classroom Teachers' Association v. Board of Public Instruction the Florida supreme court responded by enjoining the disgruntled teachers from use of any concerted
activity.16 The discontent registered in Pinellas precipitated a total breakdown
of relations between government and public employee unions resulting in a
statewide teachers' strike in February 1968,17 followed by sanitation worker
walkouts during the summer of 1968.18
The inadequacy of section 839.221 is clear. By allowing only the presentation of union proposals to government, the provision deprives public employees of the benefit of good faith bargaining that results when opposing
sides deal from positions of equal power. The absence of legislation requiring
mandatory bilaterial good faith bargaining between government and public
sector unions requires the unions to employ the only means available to offset
this power imbalance - the strike. For this reason a strike ban unattended by
mandatory bargaining provisions is ineffective.Y9

eignty and its abhorrence of strikes may also have a basis in the early Supreme Court decision of Dorchy v. Kansas, which held that neither the common law nor the federal constitution confer an absolute right to strike. 272 U.S. 303, 311 (1926).
The sovereignty theory has recently come under widespread attack. For example, in
his dissent in Teachers Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, a decision that enjoined
striking Indiana teachers, Chief Justice DeBruler considered the bases for the disparate
treatment of public sector unions. He concluded: (1) the impact of public sector strikes is
not always greater, and may be less, than strikes by private sector unions; (2) public employees, too, are guaranteed certain inalienable constitutional rights; (3) without adequate
legislation to ensure collective bargaining rights, public employees must have some method
of asserting their rights; (4) in many cases, distinctions between public and private employers
are non-existent; and (6) the concept of public employee strikes as an attack on government
is a myth to avoid dealing with the issues. 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969) (DeBruler,
C.J., dissenting), rehearing denied, 254 N.E.2d 329, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970).
12. For example, when faced with a teachers' strike in Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board
of Educ. the Connecticut supreme court reaffirmed the common law ban on strikes by public
employees but held that collective bargaining could take place within the limits of the strike
prohibition. 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
13. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-223, §§1-4.
14. Id. §1.
15. Id. §2.
16. 214 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1968).
17. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1968, §1, at 1, col. 2.
18. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1968, §1, at 33, col. 4 (Tampa, Fla.); N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1968,
§1, at 9, col. I (Dade County, Fla.).
19. See Comment, Labor Relations: Public School Teachers, The Right To Strike and
Collectively Bargain, 21 U. FLA. L. RIv. 403 (1969).
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ConstitutionalRevision
The 1968 Florida constitution produced an implicit change in the law.
20
Article I, section 6, provides:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor
organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public
employees shall not have the right to strike.
A cursory analysis of the new section 6 suggests that it represents an
integration of the prior constitutional provision 2 ' and section 839.221, Florida
Statutes, without producing a substantial change in the law. However, in
Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association v. Ryan 22 the Florida supreme
court educed an ambiguity in the provision. Although the trial court found
that the new constitutional provision did not alter the rule established in
Miami Water Works, which prohibited collective bargaining by public employees,2 the supreme court construed the word "employees" in the new provision to include both public and private employees. 2 4 The court reversed and
held that "with the exception of the right to strike, public employees have
the same rights of collective bargaining as are granted private employees by
Section 6."25 Although section 839.221 was held to conform with the constitutional provisions, the court impliedly conceded the statute's inadequacy by
calling upon the legislature to "enact appropriate legislation setting out standards and guidelines and otherwise regulate the subject within the limits of
said section 6."28
The court's mandate in Ryan may have been influenced by the then effective Fire Fighters' Bargaining Act 27 of 1967, which provided for obligatory
good faith bargaining between local governmental authorities and fire fighter's
unions. 28 The act specifically prohibited strikes but guaranteed a right to the
resolution of disputed questions through advisory arbitration.29 Legislative

20. FLA. CONST. art. I, §6 (emphasis added).
21. See note 7 supra.
22. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
23. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.

24. The court reasoned that the interpretation afforded the prior constitutional provision in Miami Water Works was not determinative of the construction to be afforded the
1968 revision, since Florida Statutes, §839.221, had changed prior law that denied all forms
of collective bargaining to public employees. 225 So. 2d at 905-06. See text accompanying
notes 6-9 supra. Thus, the statute that specifically gave only restricted rights of collective
bargaining to public employees provided the impetus for far broader constitutional rights.
25. 225 So. 2d at 905.
26. Id. at 906.
27. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-900, §§1-16 (expired 1969). The act was applicable only to
counties having population in excess of 390,000.

28. Id. §5.
29. Id. §§6, 11.
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initiative via the Fire Fighters' Bargaining Act suggested the methodology by
which the Ryan goal of comprehensive legislation could be readily achieved.
Yet the goal was to prove elusive.
Executive Intervention
The issue was complicated by the intervention of the executive branch in
1970. By executive order,30 Governor Kirk asserted the responsibility of the
Governor as the chief budget officer-l to make budgetary recommendations,
and the responsibility of the legislature to determine the distribution of the
tax dollar. 32 Thus, any legislation that would surrender either authority
.would be vetoed by the Governor in order to preserve the orderly processes
of government."3 3 Accordingly, special acts34 providing rights of collective
bargaining for firemen of two counties were vetoed.32 The legislature passed
one bill over the veto during the 1970 special session,6 but gubernatorial intimidation thwarted efforts to enact comprehensive legislation.37 This executive
roadblock was removed by Governor Askew, who endorsed the Ryan decision
and urged the 1971 legislature to pass the "necessary legislation to implement
the constitutional right of public employees to collectively bargain."38
Legislative Inaction
The judicial-executive endorsement accompanied a variety of bills to the
1971 legislature. Bills were considered that would define article I, section 6,
30. Exec. Order (Fla.) (May 13, 1970, Kirk, Governor). The order decreed that no state
agency was authorized to negotiate with public employee unions and that any attempts to
organize state employees were to be immediately reported to the Governor.
31. FLA. STAT. §216.023 (1971).
32. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 216 (1971) (Planning and Budgeting; Department of
Administration).
33. Exec. Order (Fla.) (May 13, 1970, Kirk, Governor).
34. Fla. H.R. 5233 (1970) (Palm Beach County); Fla. H.R. 3761 (1970) (Pinellas County).
35. Insight into the Governor's rationale was provided in the veto message, which declared: "The subjects to be covered under the collective bargaining in this Bill are not proper
subjects for collective bargaining, when the employees are public employees. Wages, rates of
pay, hours, retirement benefits, insurance, holidays, etc., are items that involve policy decisions in the Legislative branch in the respective communities. The power cannot be delegated away, but must remain in the hands of the duly elected public officials." H.R. JOUR. 7,
Oct. 9, 1970 (special session).
36. Fla. H.R. 5233 became Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-1004.
37. Comprehensive legislation contained in Fla. H.R. 959, 3065, 3556 (1970) and Fla. S.
694 (1970) never reached the Governor as all died in legislative committees.
38. The recommendation prefaced Exec. Order 71-20 that, like the order issued by Governor Kirk, upheld the ban on negotiations between state agencies and public employee
unions and continued the requirement that any organizational union activities be immediately reported to the Governor. See note 30 supra. However, unlike Governor Kirk's, the
order suggests that the ban was continued only as an interim measure until comprehensive
legislation is enacted. Exec. Order 71-20 (Fla.) (April 5, 1971, Askew, Governor). It is arguable that both orders are susceptible to attack as contravening the intent of Florida Statutes,
§839.221.
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as denying public employees the right to strike or collectively bargain, thereby
overruling Ryan,39 grant bargaining rights to firemen only,40 and provide comprehensive bargaining rights to all public employees as mandated by Ryan.4 I
The diversity of proposals may well have prevented compromise for no collective bargaining bill passed the 1971 general session.
By 1972 the mood of the legislature had changed. Compromise resulted in
passage of the Fire Fighters' Bargaining Act 42 providing collective bargaining
procedures for all Florida firemen. A comprehensive bill delineating rights,
procedures, and penalties pertaining to all public employee unions passed the
house but died in the senate committee.43
Passage of the Fire Fighters' Bargaining Act and the absence of bills expressly overruling Ryan in the 1972 general session 44 may indicate that the
present legislative mood favors passage of comprehensive legislation for Florida's public employee unions. Predictions and promises, however, are not enacted legislation.
Recognizing that three legislative sessions failed to implement the 1968
constitutional provision, the activist Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association intervened in a case4 5 involving the application of Florida's "government
in the sunshine law"' " to school board-teacher union contract negotiations.
Responding to the request for a decree as to the collective bargaining rights of
teachers, the Florida supreme court reaffirmed Ryan, and again called upon
the legislature to act, adding that "this Court remains hesitant to allow itself
39. Article I, §6, of the 1968 constitution arguably was susceptible to two interpretations: that espoused in Ryan and that proposed in Fla. H.R.J. Res. 943 (1971): "Section 6.
Right to Work.- The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account
of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization: (a) The right
of private employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not
be denied or abridged. (b) Public employees shall not have the right to a strike or to bargain
collectively." It may be that the resolution is but a futile minority attempt to again change
the law. Conversely, it may be said that the legislature did not intend to change prior law
when drafting article I, §6, and would have agreed with the interpretation of the trial judge
in Ryan. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra. Support for this view is strengthened if
the resolution is construed as an overt effort to clarify the original legislative intent subsequently aborted by the Ryan court. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra. The resolution died in committee.
40. Fla. H.R. 959 (1971).
41. Fla. S.1350 (1971).
42. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-275. The law is substantially unchanged from its 1967 predecessor other than its general applicability to all Florida firemen. See note 27 supra.
43. Fla. H.R. 3314 (1972). The bill was an expansion of the fundamental provisions of
the Fire Fighters Bargaining Act and possibly represents a basic model of any forthcoming
law. The bill would provide a commission within the Department of Administration having
responsibility for public employee union registration, certification of bargaining units, and
resoluton of impasses. The commission would supervise mediation, factfinding, and arbitration with submittal of unresolved issues to the appropriate legislative body. Detailed procedures were also established to deal with unfair labor practices and illegal strikes. Id.
44. All bills introduced in the 1972 General Session were designed to implement rather
than to amend the constitutional provision. See note 39 supra.
45. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
46. FLA. STAT. §286.011 (1971).
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to be propelled into judicial implementation."47 In light of the legislative
inaction after the Ryan mandate, this statement could be construed as a
tempered warning that the court will not wait indefinitely for legislative implementation of public employee collective bargaining rights.
JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION?

Such judicial implementation was again urged in Dade County Classroom
Teachers' Association v. Legislature48 where a class action on behalf of all
Florida public employees sought to compel the legislature to implement their
constitutional rights. The court declined relief on the ground that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the judiciary from compelling the legislature
to exercise a purely legislative prerogative. The judicial door, however, was
left ajar; the court acknowledged that an exception to the doctrine exists where
fundamental rights are at issue. Accordingly, the court warned that if the
legislature does not act within a reasonable time, 4 the court will "have no
50
choice but to fashion such guidelines by judicial decree."
On two occasions the court has considered its intervention proper when
another branch of government has failed to deal with a problem uniquely
within its domain. In Cooper v. Tampa Electric-l the legislative failure to
regulate utility rates was held to present a justiciable claim under the Declaration of Rights as "there must be a tribunal for those aggrieved to take their
controversies." 52 Similarly, failure of the legislature to remedy inequities in
Florida's wrongful death statute53 compelled judicial redefinition of the statute
in Garner v. Ward.54 If the problem of public employee collective bargaining
Tights were as amenable to a judicial solution as the issues in Cooper and
Garner, it is probable that the court would not have delayed judicial implementation.
Implementation of collective bargaining rights for public employees presents many substantive and procedural administrative problems. Substantive
matters to be considered include the definition of appropriate bargaining
units, permissible scope of bargaining, employers' and employees' rights,
grievance resolution, and measures to deal with unlawful actions. Procedural
requirements that must be considered are the rules for registration, recognition
and certification of employee organizations, provisions for payroll deduction,

47.
48.
49.
50.

Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1972).
269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972).
Id. at 688.
Id.

51. 154 Fla. 410, 17 So. 2d 785 (1944).
52. Id. at 414, 17 So. 2d at 787. The case was remanded to the lower court, which had
granted defendant's motion to dismiss.
53. FLA. STAT. §§768.01-04 (1971), as amended, Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-35, §1.
54. 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971). See also Comment, Wrongful Death: Judicial Action in
the Face of Legislative Inaction, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 577 (1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 8
1973]

FLORIDA'S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS

and payment of fees and expenses pursuant to the collective bargaining process. 55
The court's reluctance to enter into an active legislative role is simply a
matter of judicial common sense. Despite the complexity of the issues and the
ostensible impropriety of judicial intervention, circumstances may compel the
court into action when no other remedy is forthcoming. For example, after
holding that involuntarily committed mental patients have a constitutional
right to receive individual curative treatment, the federal district court in
Wyatt v. Stickney56 implemented detailed compulsory standards for adequate
8
treatment of the mentally ill. Similarly, in Sands v. Wainwrightdetailed
administrative procedures were promulgated by the court to ensure minimum
constitutional rights to inmates involved in state prison disciplinary proceedings.
The Wyatt and Sands decisions demonstrate the competence of the judiciary to deal with complex administrative problems. But even if the Florida
court should decide that a reasonable time has passed without legislative
action, there may be no need for such detailed and comprehensive legislation
by the court. For example, in an appropriate case the court may compel good
faith bargaining within the provisions of the Fire Fighters' Bargaining Act,59
which contains the fundamental provisions likely to be found in any forthcoming comprehensive public employee bargaining act. Thus, implementation
of bargaining rights could proceed on a case-by-case basis, thereby obviating
the need for detailed court supplied guidelines.
CONCLUSION

Although the courts have demonstrated a willingness to act as a safety
valve where constitutional rights are at issue, a piecemeal judicial approach is

55. The predominant goal, however, remains one of developing a policy that removes the
necessity for illegal public employee strikes. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. 3314 (1972); Mintz, A
Florida Labor Relations Statute for Public Employees, 42 FLA. B.J. 256 (1968); Mintz, How
Should Collective Bargaining Work in the Public Service?, 42 FLA. B.J. 469 (1968).
56. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), supplementing 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

57. For example, the order provides that mental patients have a right to receive mail,
telephone calls, and visitors; the right to be free from excessive and unnecessary medication;
the right to wear their own clothes; and the right to be out doors at frequent intervals. Detailed specifications require that a minimum of 80 square feet per patient be provided in a
multipatient room; that one toilet be provided for each eight patients, and a shower for each
fifteen. The order continues by specifying the physical environment, nutritional standards,
staffing ratios, and individualized treatment plans. Further, the court reserved judgment on
a motion to enjoin expenditure of state funds on non-essential state functions should the
Alabama Legislature fail to appropriate the funds required to implement the plan. 344
F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (1972); 344 F. Supp. 387, 393 (1972).
58. 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See also Comment, Constitutional Law: Procedural Due Process in a Prison Disciplinary System, 25 U. FLA. L. Rav. 844 (1973).
59. See text accompanying notes 27, 42 supra.
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undoubtedly inferior to a comprehensive legislative enactment. After a quarter
century of experience with public employee unions, the Florida Legislature
should now be in a position to enact a comprehensive bill implementing the
constitutional right of collective bargaining to public employees. Continued
debate and reflection upon the subject by the legislature unquestionably will
result in judicial legislation. The choice is now clear.
DALE A. DxmF
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